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If man is not to do more harm than good in his efforts to improve social 
order, he will have to learn that in this, as in other fields where essential 
complexity of an organised kind prevails, he cannot acquire the full 
knowledge which would make mastery of the elements possible. He will 
therefore have to use what knowledge he can achieve, not to shape the 
results as the craftsman shapes his handiwork, but rather to cultivate a 
growth by providing the appropriate environment  
  F. A. Hayek, 1974  
1. The house of mirrors 
In this paper I assert that there is something fundamentally flawed and 
distorting in the mainstream assumptions and theories of management 
and organisation and in the practical application of these in what I call 
tool-based management.
1  
To illustrate some of the problems with distorting management theo-
ries think for a moment of the flawed, distorting mirrors that may be 
found at a fun fair. One mirror may show a person as a small fat 
individual with a bulging middle part and very short legs, while another 
mirror may show the same person as a thin individual with a long lean 
body, albeit perhaps with a very large head, or some other part made 
prominent. 
Now if the management theories work a little like the house of mirrors 
it may reflect a rather distorted picture of the individual, indicating that 
its validity would be low. In a house of real mirrors this might pose no 
real problem. We know how we can identify a mirror that could be 
assumed not to be distorting, and thus used to correct the reflections 
shown by all the distorted mirrors. With management theories it would 
prove much more difficult to guarantee that a mirror is not distorting. 
It would not help that the same mirrors, or in this case the theory, 
showed similar results every time the theory was used, that might indicate 
a reliable theory, but would not help us in finding out what the results of 
a less distorting theory would be. 
                                          
1    A previous version of some of the ideas can be found in: Petersen, V. C. (2007). "Always 
Work With a Straight Back": the fallacies of modern management and the alternative. The 
TQM Magazine, 19(2), 97-111. 2 
In the first part of the paper I shall point out some of these distortions 
and attempt to answer the question: How do the distorted reflections 
influence management practice and the people subject to this practice? 
The assumption here is that we begin to act and react more or less in 
accordance with the distorted reflection. Then I shall attempt to explain 
why so many fall prey to these distortions, disregarding their own know-
ledge and experience. I shall try to show the contours of alternative views 
that may reduce these distortions and present us with an image more fit-
ting to the needs of today’s organisations. 
 
2. The view in the mirror 
The view we see of ourselves in one of the more prominent mirrors does 
not seem very flattering. It shows us as being motivated only by a 
sophisticated form of self-interest in all our actions. What we see is the so 
called REMM reflection. In this mirror put up by Jensen and Meckling
2 
the most prominent features reflected show us to be Resourceful, 
Evaluative, and Maximising.  
In short we are shown as smart, but unscrupulous maximisers, ready to 
use every loophole available to our own advantage, and trade everything 
in order to maximise our own satisfaction. It is only a question of price. 
We can be bought. We are willing to give up anything we value, if we 
can just get enough of something else we value. Moral stance and love 
may be exchanged for a sufficiently large amount of some material goods 
that is also valued, like perhaps a big flat screen TV or a Porsche. Or a 
child perhaps for a sailboat? “The fact that all individuals make trade-offs 
(or substitute in virtually every dimension imaginable) means that there 
are no such thing as human “needs” […] There are only human wants, 
desires, or, in the economists language, demands.”
3  
This means that we are not to be trusted, neither as managers nor as 
mere employees. The only thing that we could be trusted to follow would 
be our self-interest. Showing us with these prominent features we may 
                                          
2   Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994). See also the discussion in: Petersen, V. C. 
(2005). The Otherworldly View of Economics – and its consequences: CREDO working 
paper, The Department Management and International Business, The Aarhus School of 
Business 
3   Ibid. p. 9/10. 3 
begin to act according to them, developing for instance bigger and bigger 
dark splotches of self-interested and egotistical behaviour. While the very 
thin and vague other-regarding sentiments found in this reflection would 
let these inclinations shrink and shrivel. 
The implication of accepting this distorted view would be that we 
would be inclined to act and react as if this was a true view. This is for 
instance what may have happened in the public sector.  
Le Grand
4 describes how the view of those who work in the public 
sector in the UK has changed from a view in which individuals were seen 
as motivated by altruism, acting like knights as it were, to a view in 
which individuals were seen as motivated mostly by their self-interest, 
and thus acting like knaves. It is to be assumed that in similar manner the 
users of public services are more and more seen as demanding customers 
with rights and demands, not needs. Acting also out of self-interest with 
very little regard for the common interest. This change of view of course 
goes hand in hand with a greater emphasis on market based schemes in 
the provision of public services.  
“In the view of policy-makers, and indeed of the public at large, then, 
people—funders, providers and recipients of state services alike—were 
neither knights nor pawns but “knaves”: self-interested actors who would 
(to mix metaphors) respond to carrots and sticks designed to reward or 
punish particular kinds of behaviour.”
5  
Thus in order to achieve a common purpose outside our self-interest 
we would either have to harness this self-interest – or create incentives 
that would appeal to this self-interest.  
Harnessing would mean that we have to create as a minimum a set of 
explicit rules, a system of controls to catch rule transgressions and some 
kind of punishment system to be used when rules are transgressed. This 
whole system would have to be very much in evidence and calculable in 
advance in order to influence people’s behaviour in a consistent way. 
                                          
4   Grand, J. L. (2003). Motivation, Agency and Public Policy: Of Knights and Knaves, 
Pawns and Queens. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Grand, J. L. (2003). Competition in Public Services has the Moral Virtue of Encouraging 
Respect for Their Users'. Newstatesman (13 October), 27-29. 
5   Martin, G. P., Phelps, K., & Katbamna, S. (2004). Human Motivation and Professional 
Practice: of Knights, Knaves and Social Workers. Social Policy & Administration, 38(5), 
470-487, p. 472. 4 
Incentives would mean that we somehow make it worthwhile for peo-
ple to act in a way that serves some common purpose, be it of a company 
or a society. 
A simple version of the problem might be found in agency theory, the 
roots of which go back to the classic “The Modern Corporation and Pri-
vate Property”
6, and in transaction cost theory, which refers back to 
Coase’s “The nature of the Firm”
7. When there is separation of ownership 
and control, “the interests of the latter are as likely as not to be at variance 
with those of ownership.”
8 This can be generalised to all cases in which 
one party, the agent, works for another party, the principal.  
The problem in agency theory is twofold. The agent is expected to 
serve his own interests which may be different form the interest of the 
principal, and it may be difficult to observe and verify that the agent is 
actually working in the interest of the principal. Thus there is a need for 
measures that will align the interests of the principal and the agent, and 
avoid or minimise the moral hazard involved.  
One way to curb the self-interest of the agent would be to rely on the 
conditions of an explicit contract, specifying what the agent has to do and 
what he has to achieve. That would be a kind of legalistic solution.
9 In 
order to make sure that the conditions of the contract are fulfilled, some 
kind of control is necessary, and presumably also some kind of sanction 
to be carried out if the conditions of the contract are breached.  
Ghoshal and Moran
10 argue that the theories and the views of man and 
his behavioural motives inherent in the transaction cost theory of for 
instance Williamson, may actually lead one in practice to erect barriers to 
the behaviour postulated by the theory. Behaviour that would seem 
strangely similar to the behaviour of REMM men. To guard against this 
supposed behaviour the hierarchies and structures found in traditional 
organisations would be created. Detailed and all encompassing written 
rules of conduct would be made and systems for monitoring adherence to 
                                          
6   Berle, A. A., & Gardiner, C. M. (1932). The Modern Corporation and Private Property. 
New York: Macmillan.  
7   Coase, R. (1937). The Nature of the Firm. Economica, 4(16), 386-405. 
8   Stelzer, I. M. (2004). The Corporate Scandals and the American Capitalism. The Public 
Interest, National Affairs, Inc. (Winter). p.3 
9   Sitkin, S. B., & Roth, N. L. (1993). Explaining the Limited Effectiveness of Legalistic 
"Remedies" for Trust/Distrust. Organization Science, 4(3), 367-392 
10   Ghoshal, S., & Moran, P. (1996). Bad for Practice: a critique of the transaction cost 
theory. Academy of management Review, 21(1), 13-47. 5 
these rules would be erected and so forth and so on. Thus in practice cre-
ating and enforcing a system of distrust and control.
11  
The more we attempt to anchor responsibilities in specific written 
statements and special institutions, the more we lose individual com-
mitment to all the vaguer notions of trust and individual responsibility, 
and rules and controls can never fully substitute trust and a sense of 
responsibility. 
All such behavioural rules, unlike some rules of formal systems, are 
necessarily indeterminate. They will leave much open. Even the most 
detailed rules and procedures cannot specify in all detail what action one 
is to take. Rules are always underdetermining action. This together with 
the impossibility of achieving a very detailed control system, means that 
in effect the attempt to control the behaviour of individuals driven by 
self-interest will not succeed. Instead they will act in a REMM-like fash-
ion. They will not be looking to the purpose of the regulation. Instead 
they will be looking to the wording of the rules in their attempt to find 
loopholes. “They respond creatively to the opportunities the environment 
presents to them, and they work to loosen constraints that prevent them 
from doing what they wish to do.”
12  
This means that regulation does not necessarily promote a responsible 
attitude in business, it may only force it to look responsible. The attitude 
of REMM-like decision-makers in business might actually become less 
responsible, and I am not sure that we will ever be able to come up with 
enough rules to compensate for this. Perhaps the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is 
an indicator of this problem. 
Alternatively some kind of incentive scheme might be used to align 
the interests of the agent to that of the principal. The conditions for get-
ting this incentive might of course be more or less explicitly specified in a 
contract and a set of measurable objectives. 
An example of such a scheme would executive compensation. Basing 
those compensation schemes on the achievements of the company over a 
certain limited time period, and as measured by growth in turnover, prof-
its and/or share prices, is assumed to motivate management to greater 
efforts. 
                                          
11   Sitkin, S., & Stickel, D. (1996). The Road to Hell: The dynamics of distrust in an era of 
quality. In R. Kramer & T. Tyler (Eds.), Trust in Organizations. Thousand Oaks, CA: 
Sage 
12   Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1994). Op. cit.  6 
Frey and Osterloh
13 argue that performance pay schemes for managers 
provide managers with incentives for creative manipulation of the criteria 
used to measure performance. They even suggest that such schemes could 
lead to fraudulent accounting in order to fulfil the criteria. Their conclu-
sion: managers should be paid like bureaucrats. The problem with their 
suggestion is that today governments everywhere seek to introduce simi-
lar schemes for top bureaucrats, probably with the same problematic 
results, manipulation of criteria and perhaps even fraud. 
The recent examples of fraudulent stock options back dating in order 
to achieve a better outcome, may indicate that Frey and Osterloh are 
right.  
Other studies certainly seem to confirm this. In their book “Pay With-
out Performance”
14 Bebchuk and Fried argue that a number of factors in 
fact prevent executive performance pay schemes from having any relation 
to performance. A lack of arm’s length separation between a board and an 
executive seeking better schemes for raising his pay may mean that pay is 
more a result of powerful executive influence with a board that accepts 
schemes not related to performance, or perhaps even hidden forms of 
compensation, the cost of which is camouflaged. 
In a series of experiments using rats and doves in the fifties Skinner 
had shown that rewards and punishments could influence behaviour.
15 
Rewarding a given behaviour increased the likelihood that the behaviour 
would be shown again. In rats at least. When this behaviour was no 
longer rewarded, the likelihood of showing the previously rewarded 
behaviour declined to what it had been before the behaviour was 
rewarded. Vice versa, if certain forms of behaviour were punished, the 
probability of this type of behaviour was reduced. 
These results of Skinner’s and other behaviourists’ experiments “led 
to a widespread advocacy of rewards as a motivational strategy.”
16 The 
experiments with rat-behaviour seemed to support the idea that REMM-
man would in his self-interested way also show a rat-like behaviour and 
                                          
13   Frey, B. S., & Osterloh, M. (2005). Yes, Managers Should be Paid Like Bureaucrats. 
University of Zurich: CESifo Working Paper. 
14   Bebchuk, L., & Fried, J. (2004). Pay Without Performance: the unfulfilled promise of 
executive compensation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
15   Skinner’s theories in relation to human behavior may be found in: Skinner, B. F. (1953). 
Science and Human Behavior (1965 ed.). New York: Free Press.  
16   Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). A Meta-Analytical Review of 
Experiments Examining Extrinsic Rewards. Psychological Bulletin, 125(6), 627-668, p. 
627. 7 
react in the same way to rewards. Perhaps the same can be said about the 
ideas of the modern “Business Performance” movement.
17  
Is that how we are motivated? Or is human-like behaviour different? 
According to the studies of for instance Deci, Koestner, Ryan and 
Frey, Jegen
18 an increase in say the monetary incentives for carrying out a 
certain activity might actually diminish the intrinsic motivation for 
carrying out that activity. In effect crowding out such motives. The result 
would be that overall motivation decreases with a resulting drop in 
productivity, quality or whatever we are using to measure the output from 
the activity.
19 
Now such an idea goes directly against the postulates of economic 
theory, according to which monetary incentives would of course contri-
bute to an increase in motivation, resulting in a higher effort and 
presumably also a higher output from the activity. Thus the crowding out 
of intrinsic motivation is what Frey calls an anomaly in economics, it 
cannot be explained by the theory. It does not belong to the realm of 
economic theory, it is not comprehensible. 
The problem with both harnessing schemes and the many different 
incentive schemes is thus that they make us behave like the distorted 
reflection in the mirror. This is confirmed, at least for the public sector by 
Martin, who concludes:  
“What we witness is not the state succeeding in tapping the essential 
motivation of its servants, but rather the state making knaves or pawns of 
these professionals by structuring their roles according to its presump-
tions about their motivation.”
20  
The distortions of the mirror thus lead to a furthering of self-interest 
and distrust, crowding out otherregarding interests and trust and creating 
the need for even more rules, controls and incentives. Thus in essence 
                                          
17   What distinguishes behaviorists (and pop-behaviorists, who identify themselves not as 
Skinnerians but as "performance management" experts and suchlike) is not a predilection 
for using rewards so much as a tendency to focus on behavior -- as though only that 
which can be seen and measured is real. (Kohn, A. (1998). Challenging Behaviorist 
Dogma. Compensation & Benefits Review (March/April).) 
18   Deci, E. L., Koestner, R., & Ryan, R. M. (1999). Op.cit. 
Frey, B. S., & Jegen, R. (2000). Motivation Crowding Theory: a survey of empirical 
evidence. Munich: Working Paper, CESifo, Ifo Center for Economic Studies 
19   Jenkins. G. D. (1986). Financial Incentives. In E. A. Locke (Ed.), Generalizing from 
Laboratory to Field Settings. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books.  
20   Martin, G. P., Phelps, K., & Katbamna, S. (2004). Op.cit., p. 482. 8 
making sure that everyone behaves like a knave, and diminishing the 
value of acting in a more otherregarding way.  
3. Intelligent design and control? 
The term intelligent design might today often be taken to denote the idea 
that behind all the complexity that we can observe in the world, there 
must have been a supernatural designer, a God. Thus asserting, that a 
kind of Darwinian evolution and natural selection cannot explain the 
intricate, complicated and complex designs we find in nature. In relation 
to our discussion in the paper we have to turn this idea upside down. 
Today we seem to have taken over the designer role from God, in the 
belief that man can act as the intelligent designer. This is how I see the 
attempt to control the future through our own intelligent designs and the 
use of sophisticated tools.  
Van Gunsteren once talked about the “The Quest for control”
21 in his 
criticism of a certain kind of control rationality, the rational-central-rule, 
meaning the generation and implementation of plans made by a limited 
number of centres. He describes how this rationality has led to attempts to 
impose a kind of cybernetic order on social processes, seemingly making 
it possible to gain control over the future of society using intelligent 
planning and sophisticated tools.  
In a series of counter arguments van Gunsteren denies that it is 
possible to gain this kind of control over the future, at least at the level of 
society. “Although all people can act, that is, begin something new, no 
one can control or predict the consequences of action. The quest for 
rational-central control constitutes a denial of human plurality without 
which no meaningful human world–and therefore no meaningful joint 
action–is possible. The rational-central-rule approach can by itself, 
however, never be successful, because more controls are always needed. 
It is not a liberating force, but an iron capsule flying towards a crash.”
22  
Today the popular ideas of risk management seem to contain some of 
the basic beliefs found in the quest for control over the future. The 
apparent success in handling the more traditional risks associated with the 
natural environment, our health, our economic well-being, may lead us to 
                                          
21   Gunsteren, H. R. v. (1976). The Quest for Control: A critique of the rational-central-rule 
approach in public affairs. London: John Wiley. 
22   Ibid. p. 147/48. 9 
believe that all sorts of risks could be controlled, especially of course 
those that represent man made risks, for example the effects of green 
house gases.  
“[R]isk management covers all the processes involved in identifying, 
assessing and judging risks, taking actions to mitigate or anticipate them, 
and monitoring and reviewing progress. Or as the OGC defines it – 
ensuring that the organisation makes cost-effective use of the risk pro-
cess. Risk management requires processes in place to monitor risks; 
access to reliable, up-to-date information about risk; the right balance of 
control in place to deal with those risks; and decision-making processes 
supported by a framework.”
23  
Similar ideas about intelligent design and control are predominant 
features in the theories of management seen in the reflections in the house 
of mirrors. 
 There is a direct line from the thoughts of Taylor, Fayol and Weber to 
modern attempts to gain control over the future of companies and public 
institutions.  
Among Taylor’s four duties for management
24 we find for instance: 
-  First. They develop a science for each element of a man's work, 
which replaces the old rule-of-thumb method.  
-  Second. They scientifically select and then train, teach, and 
develop the workman, whereas in the past he chose his own work 
and trained himself as best he could.  
-  Third. They heartily cooperate with the men so as to insure all of 
the work being done in accordance with the principles of the sci-
ence which has been developed.  
-  Fourth. There is an almost equal division of the work and the 
responsibility between the management and the workmen. The 
management takes over all work for which they are better fitted 
than the workmen, while in the past almost all of the work and 
the greater part of the responsibility were thrown upon the men. 
                                          
23   The Strategy Unit, C. O. (2002). Risk: Improving government’s capability to handle risk 
and uncertainty. London: Admiralty Arch, The Mall, London, p. 7. 
OGC is Office of Government Commerce. “OGC offers guidance to improve the way the 
public sector manages programmes and projects. Making them more successful will 
enhance the quality of new initiatives and make UK government organisations more 
effective and efficient.” http://www.ogc.gov.uk/index.asp. 
24   Taylor, F. W. (1911). The Principles of Scientific Management. New York: Harper & 
Row. Quoted from an electronic source. 10 
This fits quite well with Faoyl’s ideas of management organised under 
the headings “Prevoyance, Organisation, Commandment, Controle.”
25  
Later we find more elaborate ideas in the whole body of administra-
tive science exemplified for instance by the work of Gulick and Urwick, 
who seemed to regard organisation as a technical problem.
26 Further roots 
may be found in production management and in industrial engineering
27. 
What we see in these theories are the clear imprint of attempts to 
rationalise about human behaviour. Simon’s “Models of man”
28 comes to 
mind immediately with its emphasis on decision-making using the idea of 
bounded rationality. Other attempts to algorithmetise problem solving 
and decision making in general may be found in systems thinking and 
operations research.  
Recent attempts to gain control over the future using intelligent 
designs include the use of tools like: business process reengineering, ISO-
9000 standards, six sigma, total quality management, balanced 
scorecards, performance management, lean management and knowledge 
management schemes.  
Overall the quest for control manifests itself in the focus upon: 
 
-  Explicit goals and detailed plans 
-  Complete description of all activities 
-  Use of standards and tools  
-  Achievement of tangible results 
-  Measurements, evaluations 
-  Corrections to achieve goals 
 
                                          
25   Fayol, H. (1930). Industrial and General Administration (1930 ed.). London: Pitman.  
26   Gulick, L. & Urwick, L. (1937). Papers on the Science of Administration. New York: A. 
M. Kelly. 
27   Newer examples might include: Magee, J. F. & Boodman, D. M. (1967). Production 
Planning and Inventory Control. New York: McGraw-Hill; Dilworth, J. B. (1992). 
Operations Management: Design, planning, and control for manufacturing and services. 
London: McGraw-Hill. 
28   Simon, H. A. (1956). Models of Man - Mathematical Essays on Rational Human 
Behaviour in a Social Setting. New York: Wiley. 
Simon, H. A. & Newell, A. (1958). Heuristic Problem Solving: The Next Advance in 
Operations Research. Operations Research, 6, 1-10. 11 
This focus is found more and more in the public sector too, where it is 
part of the collection of ideas and theories grouped under the name of 
New Public Management (NPM).
29  




1 – SET STANDARDS AND PERFORM WELL  
1.1.1You set precise, measurable and challenging standards for 
core services; where relevant these build on national 
statutory standards.  
1.1.2 You set precise, measurable and challenging standards for 
customer service, measuring quality as well as quantity.  
1.2.3You review and raise your standards each year, wherever 
possible. 
 
Universities might for instance specify precise goals like the number 
of refereed scientific publications per researcher and year, the amount, 
absolute or relative, of external financing, the number of students, the 
number of exchange programs and so forth. Objectives like these may be 
found in recent Danish university development contracts.
31 Shown here 




Target 20  
In the period 2006-2008, Aalborg University will double the 
number of women professors from 7 in 2005 to 14 in 2008.  
Target 21  
On 20 February, 2006, Aalborg University was registered with 
participation in 8.8 scientific and other articles, news broadcasts, 
                                          
29   Hood, C. (1991). A Public Management for All Seasons? Public Administration, 
69(Spring), 3-19. 
Osborne, D., & Gaebler, T. (1992). Reinventing Government. Reading, MA: Addison 
Wesley 
30   Charter Mark is the UK Government's national standard for excellence in customer 
service. It sees itself as “a positive force for change and customer service improvement.” 
31   Some of the original intentions can be seen in: University performance contracts for 
Denmark's universities: Greater autonomy, stronger universities. (1999). Copenhagen: 
Ministry of Research and Information Technology, http:www.fsk.dk/fsk/publ/1999/uni/ 
32   Aalborg University’s development contract 2006-2008. (2006): 
http://en.aau.dk/About+Aalborg+University/development-contract 12 
etc. per research full-time equivalent in 2005. Aalborg University 
will work towards an increase in this figure to 9.5 in 2008 
(VBN/Info Paq).  
Target 22  
On 20 February, 2006, 5.0 scientific publications had been reg-
istered per research full-time equivalent in 2005. Aalborg Uni-
versity will work towards an increase in this figure to 5.5 in 2008 
(VBN/PURE).  
 
The remarkable thing is that these goals seldom if ever relate directly to 
what must be the overall purpose of a university. And this seems to be a 
general characteristic of many attempts to create explicit and precise 
goals. The purpose of such goals is simply to make goals explicit and 
measurable. Overall purposes are relegated to the less important and more 
flowery language of vision and mission statements, if at all. 
 One can only guess what this means in the long run, but it is reason-
able to assume that employees and staff will find it easier to toe the line 
and orientate their efforts towards the more explicit goals, even though 
they themselves may wish to strive to fulfil a vague but important overall 
purpose. 
“ Cycles of research have changed in favour of publication in prestig-
ious journals rather than books. Scientists are changing research habits, 
and a whole menu of activities for which performance measures have not 
been devised have ceased to have official value.”
33  
 Attempts to make a complete description of the detailed objectives, 
activities and procedures in order to make sure that explicit standards are 
achieved or upheld, and reduce risk of non-intended consequences, may 
perhaps be illustrated with excerpts from the ISO standards.  




-  processes should be defined, 
-  procedures should be appropriately documented, 
-  the organization should be functioning as documented, and 
                                          
33   Power, M. (1997). The Audit Society: Rituals of verification. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, p. 100. 
34   Harrington, H. J. & Mathers, D. D. (1997). ISO 9000 and Beyond: From Compliance to 
Performance Improvement. New York: Mcgraw-Hill, p. 13. 13 
-  records should be kept to verify that the procedures are being fol-
lowed.  
 
Among these are requirements for: Management Responsibility, 
Quality System, Document and Datacontrol, Process Control, Corrective 
and Preventive action. 
Management Responsibility encompasses the development and 
expression of quality policy. Management must define the objectives, 
assign responsibility, and assure clear lines of authority, not the least for 
the implementation, maintenance and reviewing of the quality system. It 
must also assign “the proper level of resources to activities that impact 
[on] quality.”
35  
The Quality System consists of a quality manual, “to express how its 
products and services conform to the stipulated requirements”
36, and a 
quality plan that defines and documents how the requirements will be met 
and continuously improved.  
Document and Datacontrol require a system for documentation and 
control of all the data, documentation and information, necessary for 
maintaining and updating the quality system. Furthermore “[i]t should 
ensure that obsolete documents are removed from all areas.”
37  
Process Control concerns the documentation of production and work 
processes in order to ensure that the end product or service has the quality 
described in the quality system. Some of the elements are: “Documenting 
procedures where their absence could adversely affect quality”; “Con-
tinuous monitoring and control of the process parameters by qualified 
personnel”; “Maintaining records for qualified processes, equipment and 
personnel as appropriate.”
38 
The Corrective and Preventive requirement concerns procedures in 
relation to customer complaints, and reports of products and services not 
up to the standards of quality prescribed. “The firm specifies how it 
determines what went wrong, who should fix it, how that person is to be 
accurately informed, when the problem is to be solved, how it controls 
that the problem is solved and how to prevent a reoccurrence.”
39  
                                          
35   Ibid., p. 60. 
36   Davis, L. (1997). Quality Asssurance: ISO 9000 as a Management Tool. Copenhagen: 
Handelshøjskolens Forlag 
37   Harrington & Mathers (1997), Op. cit., p. 62. 
38   Ibid., p. 63. 
39   Davis (1997), Op. cit., p. 42/43.  14 
That does not sound too far from what Taylor wrote in 1911: “Perhaps 
the most prominent single element in modern scientific management is 
the task idea. The work of every workman is fully planned out by the 
management at least one day in advance, and each man receives in most 
cases complete written instructions, describing in detail the task which he 
is to accomplish, as well as the means to be used in doing the work.”
40 In 
our view many of the tools mentioned here represent a kind of Neo-Tay-
lorism. 
The attempt to create such all encompassing descriptions may remind 
one of Borges’ small story of exactitude in science. This is the story of an 
attempt to construct an exact map of a geographic area. Trying to make 
the map more and more exact and comprehensive the map grew bigger 
and bigger. The ultimate map showing the landscape in 1:1 scale turned 
out to be extremely unwieldy and costly. In fact it would cover, when 
unfolded, the whole area that it was supposed to cover. In Borges’ story 
“succeeding Generations came to judge a map of such Magnitude cum-
bersome, and, not without Irreverence they abandoned it to the Rigours of 
Sun and Rain.
41“ 
Modern management apparently has not learned the lesson. Their 
tools are characterised by a clear tendency towards algorithmisation and 
documentation, a tendency to specify in similar 1:1 detail exactly what 
one is to do in given situations. Still, no matter how much energy and 
effort is spent on the attempts to give a full description of all the pro-
cesses somehow regarded as important, the attempt to create quasi-algo-
rithms for every aspect of a business or a public organisation will turn out 
to be futile. In fact, one may expect that every attempt to give a precise 
description of what to do, by whom and when, will turn out to be inde-
terminate, in the sense it will never be sufficient to determine precisely 
what to do. Almost like in the case of the rules we described a short while 
ago. 
 “The situations in which humans find themselves are given as parts of 
a meaningful order, because they are embedded in the actor’s forms of 
life. This is the starting point of all understanding, action and rule-fol-
lowing. It is not the result of our being programmed with rules.”
42 
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Wittgenstein seems to agree
43. The attempt to follow a rule means that 
one is ruled by a rule in a mechanical way, which will also mean that one 
at least attempts to leave individual responsibility and judgment out of the 
decision and action. This is exactly what we believe is happening, not in 
the simple sense that rules determine how we act in any robot-like sense, 
that would be impossible as algorithm-like rules are always underdeter-
mining action, but in the sense that detailed and algorithm-like rules off-
load the individual of responsibility. They represent formalisations of 
responsibility that will weaken the individual “spring of morality.” They 
represent as it were lazy solutions that because of the rule-format will 
tend to weaken the consideration of informal and vaguer aspects of 
responsibility – and may we add understanding and insight. 
It is somewhat worrying to see that many of the demands for control 
found in modern management theories and tools are quite close to the 
descriptions used to diagnose autism. Not all of them of course, but take a 
look: 
Under “Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour, 
interests and activities,”
44 we find the following description: 
 
a.  encompassing preoccupation with one or more stereotyped and 
restricted patterns of interest that is abnormal either in intensity 
or focus.  
b.  apparently inflexible adherence to specific non-functional rou-
tines or rituals.  
c.  stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms eg: hand or finger 
flapping or twisting, or complex whole-body movements.  
d.  persistent preoccupation with parts of objects. 
 
I believe that it is possible to see at least some similarities, and if this 
is correct, it would confirm the suspicion that modern theories of man-
agement show a very disturbing reflection of what management is about. 
A reflection that must have consequences for the practice of managers, 
who believe in this reflection.  
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4. Managing the metrics and achieving arbitrary goals 
Today we are inundated with attempts to put life into tabular form. Every 
one has had the experience of being asked to answer a questionnaire, on 
topics touching upon all imaginable aspects of human life. Afterwards a 
flood of numbers, tables, curves and graphs are generated, showing qual-
ity of life, product quality, leadership quality, teaching quality, service 
quality or customer/client satisfaction of everything from car dealers to 
hospitals and kindergartens.  
Advanced societies have become obsessed with quantification. Per-
haps like Dickens’ Mr. Gradgrind: “With a rule and a pair of scales, and 
the multiplication table always in his pocket, sir, ready to weigh and 
measure any parcel of human nature, and tell you exactly what it comes 
to.”
45 
 In “Trust in Numbers” Porter argues: “Strict quantification, through 
measurement, counting, and calculation, is among the most credible 
strategies for rendering nature or society objective. It has enjoyed wide-
spread and growing authority in Europe and America for about two cen-
turies. In natural science its reign began still earlier.”
46  
“Objective” is a key term, with quantification we can distance our-
selves from the vagaries of just verbal statements, subjective opinions, 
and ineffable knowledge. “Exact results, even if faulty, are to be preferred 
to imprecise, sweeping conclusions, to “the statements which we perpetu-
ally receive from economists, of that which must necessarily be but yet is 
not, and to general ‘truth,’ to which each particular case is an excep-
tion.”
47  
 Accompanying the demand for clear and explicit goals we find the 
striving for measures that will enable us to judge exactly how far we have 
come in achieving the clear goals. This must be seen as an important part 
of modern ideas of performance management. In a publication issued by 
the Danish Ministry of Finance the connection between clear goals and 
measurements is emphasised: “In the strategy for effectiveness the 
department can describe how the proposed clear goals can be accompa-
nied by scales of evaluation or success criteria that will make it possible 
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unequivocally to evaluate whether the institution has lived up to each of 
the clear goals.”
48  
 This will make it possible to create elaborate evaluation-, bench-
marking- and auditing schemes that can be used to hold the institution 
accountable, in essence forcing it to focus narrowly on the achievement 
of the explicit goals in competition with others working for similar goals. 
Almost like the Key Performance Indicators (KPI) used in business.  
“ In short, audits work because organizations have literally been made 
auditable; audit demands the environment, in the form of systems and 
performance measures, which makes a certain style of verification possi-
ble.”
49 
Inspiration for such schemes could come from the schemes used by 
the Department of Health in the UK. An example being the elaborate star 
rating system. “The overall performance rating of an NHS trust is made 
up of a number of performance indicators. Performance indicators show 
how trusts are doing in relation to some of the main targets set by the 
Government for the NHS, as well as other broader measures of 
performance. They include information from surveys of staff and 
patients, and other measures useful to patients and carers.”
50  
 The whole system is too complicated to go through here but an illus-
tration of some of the key target indicators used will suffice. In a descrip-
tion of the “Performance ratings methodology for 2004/05” for “Acute & 
Specialist institutions”
51 we find the so called thresholds for Key Targets, 
to be used in the rating scheme awarding the institutions 0, 1, 2, or 3 stars 
(Table1). 
Several aspects of such elaborate systems of measurement are prob-
lematic
52. There are problems related to the goals. Do the goals ade-
quately reflect the overall purpose, in the above case for the acute and 
specialist institutions? 
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The problem might be illustrated with a small example taken from 
another sector, a regional employment agency. Some of the goals of their 
contract for a given year are stated like this: Number of CV-talks: 6,500; 
Screening talks: 5,400; Individual job plans: 7,500. After half a year they 
have carried out 3,525 CV- talks, 3,900 Screening talks, and made 3,171 
job plans.
53. Even though outlook is rosy, some of these goals were 
reduced in the “Half-year Status Report for 2004.” With these reductions 
the agency looks set to achieve the reduced goals for that year, and this 












12 hour waits for 
emergency admis-
sion via A&E post 
decision to admit 
100.0%   Greater than or 
equal to 99.5% and 
less than 100.0% 
Less than 99.5% 
All cancers: two 
week wait 
98% or more  Greater than or 
equal to 95% and 
less than 98% 
Less than 95% 
Elective patients 
waiting longer than 
the standard 
0.03% or less  Greater than 0.03% 
and less than or 
equal to 0.15% 
Greater than 
0.15% 
Hospital cleanliness 3.0 or more  Greater than or 
equal to 2.0 and 
less than 3.0 




The only problem is, none of the goals measure whether more people 
become employed as a result of the efforts or whether the unemployed are 
getting better qualified for potential jobs. The measures are only indi-
rectly related to the overall purpose of the employment agency. They mir-
ror internal activity goals that the organisation strives really hard to reach. 
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Arbejdsmarkedsrådet (Labour Market Council) Ribe Amt. 19 
I wonder how often something like this happens, that a whole organisa-
tion directs all its efforts towards what must be regarded as rather arbi-
trary goals in relation to the overall purpose of the organisation.  
If we know nothing or only very little about the relations between the 
aspects we can measure and the qualities we want to promote, we may in 
fact find that the measurement may be both counterproductive and dis-
torting, in as much as it may have a negative influence on those subjected 
to this kind of measurement. 
What is left out in the attempt to set clear and explicit goals? Do the 
indicators and measurements used reflect all the relevant aspects of the 
goals, or has it been necessary due to difficulties of direct measurement to 
use substitute measurements that may have high reliability but an 
unknown validity. How are thresholds and cut off points set? In an 
evaluation report on the work of the National Audit Office of Denmark a 
few years back similar problems cropped up.  
“An emphasis on methods that rest on facts and results that are reli-
able but not relevant, can bias investigations, in such a way that one does 
not investigate those aspects that demand the use of interpretations and 
valuations, whose reasonableness depends upon the relationship with 
other arguments, experience and common practice.”
54  
There are problems related to the measurements as such. What kind of 
knowledge guides the overall construction of the scales? How are the 
measures used to construct the simple rating of 0, 1, 2 or 3 stars. How 
does one add waiting lists, treatment quality, and hospital cleanliness 
together into a compound measure that may place the institution into 
either a 2 or a 3 star category? 
In a discussion of more traditional performance measures Otley 
reaches the conclusion that not even in financial and accounting is the 
question of the objectivity of the measures an easy one: “Financial and 
accounting measures of performance often appear to have an objectivity, 
particular to unsophisticated users, that turns out to be illusory. The com-
ponents of any accounting ratio, for example, can be defined in a variety 
of ways. No way is objectively correct or incorrect, but rather assess-
ments have to be made concerning appropriateness for a specific use. 
Even when a ratio has been defined in a conceptually appropriate way, 
                                          
54   Petersen, V. C. (2004). Evaluering af “Beretning om elreformen” [ Evaluation of report 
on the electrical (power) reform]. København: Rigsrevisionen [National Audit Office of 
Denmark]. 20 
there remains the issue of measurement. … Accounting measures of both 
cost and profit require a myriad of subjective judgements to be made.”
55  
Most important in our discussion though are the problems related to 
the effect of the measures upon the actions of decision makers, managers, 
employees, and patients and customers in general. 
How will such schemes influence the attitude and behaviour of those 
being measured, not to speak of those using the results of research, the 
patients or customers, or the informed public in general? Might not every 
scheme like this lead people to orientate their efforts in the direction of 
what is measured and valued according to those measurements? In such a 
way that the management and employee effort will be concentrated on 
those activities that receive the highest counts for the least effort. 
Might they not get involved in a kind of number’s game in which they 
orientate their efforts towards the demands of the rating systems? Cer-
tainly, if we are to believe recent numbers from sundhedskvalitet.dk 
(Homepage for health quality) showing that Danish hospitals had 
installed thousands of extra washbasins in an attempt to get an extra star 
in the Danish version of the star rating system
56. 
Something similar also took place in the local Danish Tax authorities. 
They were subject to a management scheme that consisted in setting 
quantitative goals for the numbers of tax cases to be finished within a 
certain time period, and the result was that one concentrated first and 
foremost on the easy cases, making it easier to reach the goals set.
57  
In the case of university managers and academics subject to such 
schemes, Morley asserts that they are required ‘‘to present themselves in 
a language that quality assessors understand and value. Producing the 
right kind of optimistic and promotional self-description in mission 
statements, vision statements, and self-assessment documents 
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incorporates self-subversion and ritualistic recitation and reproduction. It 
implies a lack of ideological control over the task.’’
58 
What I am asserting is, that the methods of appraisal will influence the 
attitude and behaviour of those measured in this way, and that some im-
portant intangible aspects may be lost in the process. Insights and respon-
sibilities of management and employees are de-rated or lost, now that one 
is forced to rate one’s efforts in a much more schematic way. 
“As anyone in local government will tell you, these numerical indica-
tors are about management at a distance, and they will always miss the 
point: school league tables make teachers concentrate on borderline 
pupils at the expense of their weaker classmates; waiting-list targets per-
suade NHS managers to treat those with the quick, simple problems at the 
expense of everyone else… It is a dream from the world of management 
consultancy, encapsulated in the McKinsey slogan that ‘everything can be 
measured and what gets measured gets managed’.”
59  
The responsibility for ratings may become centralised and bureau-
cratic, located in central rating agencies with no detailed insight in the 
different topics, only in the rating schemes used.  
And what will the customers do? Will they not, unless they have some 
special insight, use the ratings to judge the institutions being rated, and 
choose to behave accordingly?  
Politicians and other decision makers involved in setting priorities for 
distribution of resources and the general public also come to depend on 
these ratings and believe that the best quality is to be found where the 
overall ratings are highest. Because: 
“Seen from a more traditional political science perspective, formalised 
accountability via auditing offers a number of advantages: its reporting 
format promotes bureaucratic formal rationality against the substantive 
rationality of professional groups and their codified abstract knowledge, it 
makes governments appear to act for and on behalf of the public in 
making inaccessible institutions more transparent and accountable, and, 
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by doing so, creates the impression of certainty, control and ‘‘accessibil-
ity”.”
60  
Certainty, control, and accessibility these are terms that fit quite well 
with the quest for control that we already have discussed. While the term 
“impression” indicates that it is the image shown that is important. What 
we get is a kind of impression management. “Without audit and the certi-
fication that follows from audit, quality remains too private an affair. One 
might conclude that there is no quality without quality assurance.”
61  
Perhaps managers fear that without these tools they would never be 
seen as real managers. Perhaps this might also explain why we sometimes 
experience a large gap between the unconscious processes and the 
attempts to create formal and rational procedures. 
Hirschhorn describes an interesting case where it turned out that a 
manager used knowledge of quantitative information, of models and 
schemes, just to appear to be in control. It turned out that the manager in 
question “was projecting a defensive fantasy that made him feel more in 
control of his situation than he actually was. In doing so, however, …[he] 
distanced himself psychologically from the very people on whom he had 
to depend in order to do his work successfully.”
62  
 And while we are at it, what are we to think of the attempts to quan-
tify personality by means of MBTI (Meyers Briggs Type Indicator) tests 
or similar schemes. None with much in the way of scientific psychologi-
cal evidence. The use of such tests to categorise people’s suitability as 
managers, team players, specific career choices or partner matching, may 
destroy the effectiveness they are supposed to promote. The individual 
who relies to any serious degree on such tests may be seen as lacking 
confidence in himself and his abilities to judge people using the most 
complicated instrument he has at his disposal, his own reasoned 
judgment, and that of people he believes in. Perhaps the widespread use 
of such tests points to a growing degree of individual uncertainty, perhaps 
even anxious neurotic behaviour.  
Common to all these attempts to create quantitative measures is the 
focus on systems of objectivity, systems that do not rely on the single 
knowing persons qualitative and reasoned judgment. It is an attempt to 
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create what Porter calls a “Cult of impersonality”: “Rigorous quantifica-
tion is demanded …because subjective discretion has become suspect. 
Mechanical objectivity serves as an alternative to personal trust.”
63  
 Not only that, measures and mechanical objectivity allow us to quan-
tify, audit, and evaluate goal achievement. Like in the case of the regional 
employment agency, the star rating of hospitals and the development 
contracts of universities. The difficult task of judging whether an institu-
tion is fulfilling its more or less implicit purpose is reduced to simple 
measurements of achievements on quantifiable goals. Almost as in the 
case of the agency problem this allows a principal to control the efforts of 
the agents subject to these measurements and audits.  
This has become an all pervasive trend to be found everywhere, not 
only as cult of impersonality, but also as a culture of quantification. 
Power talks of the “audit explosion” and “audit society”
64 while others 
put more emphasis upon the performance measure part and talk of a “per-
formance measurement society.”
65  
“Audits have become central to the legitimation of a wide range of 
entities and groups. From the governance structures of private sector cor-
porations to charities to psychotherapeutic practitioners, audit has become 
an important symbol of acceptability, indicative of ideals of transparency, 
accountability and managerial willingness to learn. To be audited or to 
say one is doing an audit is to claim institutional credibility for what one 
does.”
66  
There are dangers in this. People may respond with a kind of de-coup-
ling strategy trying to isolate themselves from the measurement schemes 
and audits with elaborate ritualistic dressing up of their efforts to suit the 
demands of the auditors, in an attempt to isolate most of the organisation 
from these ritualistic activities. 
While ritualisation is undoubtedly a danger, I expect that more and 
more elaborate systems will make it almost impossible to isolate an 
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organisation from the effects of the demands for explicitness, quantifica-
tion and audits. 
Colonisation is the other danger. It implies that the behaviour of peo-
ple in institutions changes to accommodate and adapt to the measurement 
schemes and audits. Efforts will be directed towards fulfilment of stated 
goals and to suit the measurement schemes. The emphasis on explicitness 
and quantification will also mean that non-quantifiable aspects of a pur-
pose will be ignored, and the ability of people to use their own know-
ledge, reasoning ability, judgment and sense of responsibility will be 
impaired or even perverted. The efforts will be directed towards making 
activities auditable and thus objective and visible, everything else will 
have to bow to that priority.  
Overall these reactions may result in a strange kind of superficiality, 
in simple but visible goals, simple and visible efforts, and simple and 
visible results, 0, 1, 2 or 3 stars or whatever the measure is called.  
5. Cascades of stupidity 
Why do we act so foolishly? Supposing that others can see that there are 
serious problems with the theories and methods we have just been dis-
cussing, one may wonder why so many jump the bandwagon, and a 
bandwagon it seems to be. 
What makes us use the paraphernalia of instruments and tools found 
for instance in management and in organisations? Like balanced score-
cards, which look like a miniature version of a command economy, or 
knowledge management, even though we barely know what knowledge 
is, much less how it is brought about, or incentive systems focusing on 
the individual, even though it may destroy cooperation among individu-
als. What is the cause and source of this infatuation with tools whose 
contribution to efficiency and effectiveness may seem very doubtful? 
Perhaps this infatuation may have something to do with modern busi-
ness schools research orientation and curricula. In both cases we find an 
orientation towards a more scientific stance, possibly inspired by the 
theories and rigorousness of methods used in economics and social sci-
ence in general. It is a thought that struck me some time ago when asked 
to review a journal submission characterised by one-sided or is it one-
legged emphasis on the methods used. I found cause to write the follow-
ing to the editor of a journal. 25 
“It strikes me […] that proposals like these seem to have become more 
commonplace. It is as if the use of an accepted tool, in the shape of some 
statistical analysis, makes a paper scientific even in the evident absence 
of any deeper theoretical insight. I wonder whether this isn’t becoming a 
general problem. It would mean that the use of a statistical tool (the 
method) is becoming more important than the problem or the insight into 
a theoretical background. As I see it, this isn’t a paper about ethics, it is 
more a demonstration of simple statistical tools, and that in itself might in 
a certain sense be ethically questionable.”
67  
Perhaps business schools have gone too far in the eagerness to estab-
lish a rigorous foundation for their research and curricula, in a vain 
attempt to put their subjects on a scientific footing, and ignoring Hayek’s 
warning words against scientism in social science. 
Bennis and O’Toole seem to think along the same track. “During the 
past several decades, many leading B schools have quietly adopted an 
inappropriate-and ultimately self-defeating model of academic excel-
lence. Instead of measuring themselves in terms of the competence of 
their graduates, or by how well their faculties understand important driv-
ers of business performance, they measure themselves almost solely by 
the rigor of their scientific research. They have adopted a model of sci-
ence that uses abstract financial and economic analysis, statistical multi-
ple regressions, and laboratory psychology. Some of the research pro-
duced is excellent, but because so little of it is grounded in actual busi-
ness practices, the focus of graduate business education has become 
increasingly circumscribed – and less and less relevant to practitioners.”
68  
 This is only one side of the picture, the other side is the growing 
multiplicity of management theories and tools that may seem to have a 
scientific grounding, but in reality may have more in common with 
fashion fads.  
The 2005 “Bain Management Tool Survey”
69 in the US brought the 
following ranking of tools: Strategic planning; customer relationship 
management (CRM); Benchmarking; Outsourcing; Customer segmenta-
tion; Mission and Vision statements, etc. Further down in position 11 we 
find TQM; Balanced scorecard (13); Knowledge management (15). The 
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Bain survey for what it is worth would seem to show all the characteris-
tics of a “Top of the Pops” ranking, with hasty movements up and down 
the ranking scale, thus pointing to the fad character of some of the man-
agement tools.  
Today trends and fashions, whether of management theories and tools, 
or beliefs in general, are becoming a world wide synchronised 
phenomena. That this is possible may be easy to understand, given the 
reach of modern media and communication devices and the intense 
interconnections between almost every part of the world, or at least the 
economically developed parts of the world.  
Still, that does not explain why we, the individual decision makers, 
jump the bandwagon. Where has the independent and self-confident indi-
vidual gone? On the surface this personality may seem to have been 
reduced to a kind of stereotype, stamped with the same fashion element 
that everyone else is wearing. 
 Looking for ways to understand this looking alike, this thinking alike, 
this acting alike, this parroting or herding, we may be able to discern a 
series of interrelated explanations.  
In acting alike the assertion is that each individual may possess indi-
vidual information, knowledge, beliefs or convictions, but knowingly 
ignore this. This would mean: Adaptation and following the examples set 
by others, avoiding or ignoring one’s own independent ideas, thoughts, 
knowledge, and experience. This is a phenomenon that we might refer to 
as information cascades.  
For instance carrying and opening an umbrella, imitating others who 
are still carrying open umbrellas, ignoring one’s own realisation that it is 
not raining anymore. 
A variation of this might include actively wanting to belong, to be 
accepted by others, by one’s peers, in a kind of “acceptance” cascade. 
This would also mean that potential different ideas and opinions of one’s 
own would be suppressed.  
In umbrella terms: Not choosing an umbrella in outrageous colours for 
instance, when you see that those before you have bought grey or black 
umbrellas. 
In a curious way conformity in behaviour might also be a result of 
individuals striving to be different, to get ahead of the rest, to stand on 
one’s toes to see further. To get ahead of the rest one buys the latest in 
umbrella technology, and soon discovers that many others have had 27 
exactly the same idea. A possible example of this might be the popularity 
of the book “ Blue Ocean Strategy” ranking 160
th in sales at Amazon. The 
paradoxical aspect is, that a book about finding your own way, is appar-
ently being bought by all, well not all, but I hope you see my point. Try-
ing to do something different and ending up doing the same. 
A somewhat different cause of conformity may have something to do 
with reputation. Our opinions and decisions may be influenced by repu-
tation. By people with a high reputation, or by our attempt to gain or keep 
reputation ourselves. 
In a series of very simple experiments involving quotes from novels in 
the 1930’s Sherif showed that “prestige-suggestion or stereotype plays a 
considerable part in people's judgments. In other words the attitudes 
towards authors serve as reference points. Authors rated high tend to pull 
up, and conversely authors rated low tend to pull down, the rating of the 
passages attributed to them. This is but a specific case of a general psy-
chological principle. It appears that our judgments like our perceptions, 
are organized in relation to definite reference points or in relation to a 
general level of reference.”
70  
Relevant real world examples today are seen in the clustering of inter-
est and opinions around experts, designated as gurus. Perhaps peacocks 
would be a more appropriate name. It would seem that many individuals, 
like for instance journalists lose the ability to use their own knowledge 
and common sense when referring to statements from such peacocks. 
They may state very banal or evidently self-contradictory things and still 
people may gather around them as if they have the qualities of the Oracle 
of Delphi, who was also often heard saying strange things. And the cas-
cade usually widens until in certain areas of expertise very few people 
influence what the “right” opinion is. Thus creating a kind of social cas-
cade.
71 
In many cases we confirm ourselves in our choices in a kind of spiral-
ling cascade of our own choices. Sounds weird? Well think of the woozle 
hunt in Winnie-the-Pooh
72. In this hunt Pooh, the very stupid little bear, 
hits upon a set of track marks. Convinced that they are made by the 
woozle, he sets off. Suddenly he stops and Piglet who has run after him 
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asks him: "What's the matter?". Winnie-the-Pooh has suddenly discov-
ered there are two sets of tracks in front of him. Thus concluding that he 
is following two woozles. Winnie-the-Pooh and Piglet now proceed in 
company, until Pooh suddenly stops again pointing to the tracks: "The 
tracks!" said Pooh. "A third animal has joined the other two!" "Pooh!" 
cried Piglet "Do you think it is another woozle?" Seeing that the new pair 
of paw marks are smaller, Pooh thinks it might be a wizzle. 
 Of course Winnie-the-Pooh was running in circle or more precisely a 
spiral following his own paw marks, and when Piglet joins him the foot-
marks of Piglet are added. Thus the woozles are imagined, but, in Pooh's 
view, the tracks confirm that there are more and more woozles and per-
haps a single wizzle.
73 
 We can see a kind of cascade originating in a similar way with our 
own choices, in the sense that having made a set of choices these choices 
may act somewhat like the tracks that Pooh saw convincing us that we are 
really doing the right thing. Of course. this might be multiplied by all the 
tracks already made by others, but then I suppose we are back in the 
ordinary cascade. 
6. Acts of trust and responsibility 
Imagine for a moment that you are travelling abroad with a lot of 
luggage. You have arrived in a foreign airport, a place where people are 
in most cases unknown to each other. You want to go to the lavatory but 
cannot bring all your luggage. In this situation, you may have asked 
someone apparently waiting, if he or she would look after your luggage 
for a few minutes. This is obviously in your interest, but what about the 
other person looking after your luggage. You apparently trust this person 
to live up to a small duty, looking after your luggage for a few minutes. Is 
that in the other person’s simple self-interest? Hardly, and there is no 
bond of friendship, no reward to be expected, no threat of sanctions to 
explain this expectation. 
 We trust and show trust in situations like these and in a multitude of 
other situations. Meaning, that we are not only simple REMM men, 
driven only by our self-interest, but also men possessing a sense of duty, 
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for instance in living up to the trust we are showed, men of fairness and 
men that are able to show otherregarding interests. 
 This does not have to be about the opposites of self-interest and self-
ishness versus unselfishness and altruism. It may instead be about a kind 
of sociality-interest. We have to realise that interests, that we possess, are 
not created or made by us. They are to a very large extent interests of a 
sociality. We, as individuals, may never realise the full extent of these 
interests or the precise reason why such a sociality-interest exists. In our 
upbringing most of us have just been inculcated with a sense of fairness, 
a sense of duty, and hopefully with some trust in others
74. If that was not 
the case, all our transactions with others would have to be carried out 
according to an explicit contract, under a set of controls, and under the 
threat of sanctions. 
Under the term “experimental economics” it has become increasingly 
popular to make simple game setups to test whether we in fact possess 
some of these qualities which would contradict the postulate of self-
interestedness. 
In the “Ultimatum game” for instance there are two players who 
interact in strict anonymity. The first player, the proposer, is offered a 
sum of money, under the condition that he has to propose, how to share 
this sum with the second player. The second player, the responder, can 
either accept or reject the offer knowing only the rules, the proposal, and 
the total amount of money involved. If the offer is rejected neither player 
gets anything, if it is accepted the proposal is carried out. 
In experiments it has been shown that the amount offered by the pro-
poser in most cases would exceed what could be expected according to 
strict assumptions of self-interest. Sigmund, Nowak and Fehr
75 mention 
that in two thirds of the games the offer is between 40% and 50%. Classi-
cal economic man assumptions would lead one to believe that no offer 
above zero can be too small. For the self-interested individual even a 
small amount would be better than nothing. Still in the games reported by 
Sigmund, Nowak and Fehr offers of less than 20% were rejected by more 
than half of the responders. Why is this so? 
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I would expect most people to come up with a simple answer, men-
tioning fairness or sense of justice. The proposer may judge, that a very 
small offer will seem unfair to the responder, and thus give more gener-
ous offers. The responder may find small offers unfair, thus rejecting 
such offers, which means that none of the players would get anything. 
The responder in fact foregoes the small share in order to punish the (nig-
gardly) behaviour of the proposer.  
In a certain sense, the game experiments may give us less insight into 
our values and motives than our day to day experiences in interactions 
with others, in airports and in other places. We have to understand, that 
we are not isolated individuals, but individuals living in and shaped by a 
society. Our sense of justice for instance does not originate in the 
individual, that would in itself be a strange idea. It belongs to a society 
that imposes a sense of justice upon the individual through upbringing, 
and interaction with others.  
Perhaps this is also what makes the whole experiment inexplicable 
from a pure economic view. The players are not blank human beings, 
they are human beings with a history, immersed in a society and a culture 
whose values may have been inculcated, and in which they have experi-
ences of countless encounters, often reciprocal, with others. The values 
include a sense of justice and of fairness, and how are the players to strip 
themselves of these values just because it is a game.  
 Understanding this is important because it may help us see that the 
arguments in the agency theory and in general transaction cost theory 
may not only be faulty, but inherently problematic. If we act as if the 
assertions of agency theory are correct, we actually corrode the sociality-
interest as we have called it here. We may diminish the importance of 
being trusted, the sense of duty and fairness and a whole set of values and 
inclinations that are important, not only in the day to day workings of an 
institution, but in the whole of society.  
We argue, that the internal bounds of every individual and the mutual 
bounds on individuals, do in fact make up the most basic and in a certain 
sense also the most efficient barrier to self-interested and opportunistic 
behaviour. We would also argue, that behind the principal agent relation 
we would in each and every instance have to presume the existence of the 
moral bounds, and that control, monitoring, and incentives would be less 
important in relation to that. The efficiency of the solutions proposed by 
agency theory and transactions cost theories would in fact depend on the 31 
pre-existence of some of the values we discuss in this section. No amount 
of control, surveillance, and sanctions would ever be sufficient to keep us 
within certain bounds. 
It would seem that in a certain sense the most basic and presumably 
most efficient barrier to strategic manipulation of information or inten-
tional misrepresentation of intentions, and against individuals acting only 
in their own interest, would be shared moral bounds, upheld not by any 
monitoring agency but by mutual recognition and action by the individu-
als making up the organisation. 
This assertion would seem to be supported by the conclusions reached 
in a paper called “More Order with Less Law.”
76 The paper looks at con-
tract enforcement in a game experiment in order to analyse the theoretical 
assumption, that more law increases the likelihood of keeping a contract. 
More law meaning a higher probability of enforcement and a higher cost 
of breaching the contract. 
In the game a first mover has to decide whether to enter into a contract 
without knowing whether the contract partner (the second mover) will 
honour or breach the contract. “Standard economic analysis of law 
predicts that the higher the expected cost of breach is, the more likely 
second movers are to perform.”
77 According to this view the second 
mover will behave like a REMM man, only honouring the contract if the 
expected cost of breaching it becomes too high. 
The surprising result was, that more order could be achieved with less 
law, i.e. in a situation in which parties were not forced to stick to the 
terms of a contract through the threat of costly sanctions. That contracts 
are also honoured by the second movers in the situation with low levels 
of law and enforceability demands an explanation outside the realm of 
economic man. An explanation involving reciprocity and the existence of 
trust. 
The importance of the sociality-interest of trust is underlined by the 
surge in interest in trust related issues. The workshop on trust under the 
European Institute for Advanced Management Studies is just one exam-
ple: “Due to deterioration in the binding power of reciprocal obligations, 
of hierarchical relations and of social institutions relying on hierarchy to 
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sanction deviant behaviour, other mechanisms seem to be required to 
support co-operative behaviour in interactions. Within firms, lateral rela-
tionships and alliances are growing in importance, while new linkages 
between firms are being formed to achieve and maintain competitive 
advantage in the marketplace. In network forms and alliances, organisa-
tional performance becomes increasingly dependent on trustful relations 
[my emphasis] between individuals and groups.”
78 
The deep seated values, conventions and sentiments that belong to the 
sociality-interest may perhaps be seen as a lattice structure upholding a 
society of human beings. In a libertarian society the lattice would be 
rather open and fragile leaving much latitude to individual REMM like 
men. If it becomes too fragile and open it will not be strong enough to 
preserve a society. On the other hand, a lattice cast in the concrete of 
detailed rules, controls and sanctions with only very narrow openings in it 
may leave very little room for REMM’s but may also leave very little 
room for growth and development. Seen in this light it may not be too 
wise to talk of “the cement of society” like Elster
79 does. 
The lattice is something that limits and directs the individual's activity, 
it is something much bigger than any individual. It may seldom be in the 
direct and immediate interest of a single individual. In fact, from the 
viewpoint of a REMM man, it may be seen as irrational, as something 
constraining the individual in its attempts to maximise. Only indirectly 
does it potentially benefit every individual in a society. 
“Cleaning up the environment and abstaining from polluting it are 
classical collective action problems, as are participation in community 
work, support of museums or public radio stations, adherence to a revo-
lutionary movement, honesty among tax payers or among public officials 
and voluntary donations of blood. The characteristic feature of all these 
cases is that any individual contribution generates small benefits for many 
people and large costs for one person – namely the contributor.”
80  
The lattice may thus consist of a kind of indirect cooperation, like 
paying taxes, voting in elections and giving blood. Actions that may cost 
something for the individual but result in small benefits for everyone in a 
society, even for the one who is doing the action. Even so the benefit for 
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a single individual would be too small to make REMM-like men act upon 
them. On the other hand if everyone engaged in such indirect cooperation 
it would potentially benefit all.  
The lattice also consists of values like showing trust, being truthful, 
showing fairness and justice, keeping promises and honouring agree-
ments and vague duties, perhaps by giving voice to unpopular opinions 
that one believes in. In a concrete situation a single REMM man might 
not see his advantage in honouring any of these values, but if most people 
in society act according to these values it would benefit all of us. 
7. Self-organising order  
“Phenomena like language or the market, money or morals, are not real 
artefacts, products of deliberate creation. Not only have they not been 
designed by any mind, but they are also preserved by, and depend on 
their functioning on the actions of people who are not guided by the 
desire to keep them in existence.”
81  
 The important point here is that these wholes are not a result of delib-
erate concerted actions by the individuals, guided by rational intentions 
and grand plans. It is instead a spontaneous order generated as a result of 
individual actions. Actions guided by the limited views of individuals. 
The results in the shape of the social phenomena we are talking about 
emerge behind their backs. Furthermore the “significance of the abstract 
character of such orders rests on the fact that they may persist while all 
the particular elements they comprise, and even the number of such ele-
ments, change.”
82  
Think of an anthill if you will. The individual ants may have a very 
limited view and very limited tasks. They “know” nothing of the structure 
that they erect, and the society they are creating through their individual 
actions. Even so, it is through their actions that a structure emerges that 
looks to have a very material existence and a very clear purpose. 
“For instance, a colony of ants can collectively find out where the 
nearest and richest food source is located, without any individual ant 
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knowing it. In experiments, a food source is separated from the nest by a 
bridge with two branches, one of which is longer. The shorter branch is 
most likely to be selected by the colony. This is because the ants lay and 
follow chemical trails: individual ants lay a chemical substance, a phero-
mone, which attracts other ants. The first ants returning to the nest from 
the food source are those that take the shorter path twice (from the nest to 
the source and back). Nest mates are recruited toward the shorter branch, 
which is the first to be marked with pheromone.”
83  
 What we see here, illustrates how simple behavioural rules, and in 
this case we may presumably talk about rigid hardwired rules, directing 
the behaviour of every single ant, can result in an overall structure that to 
the uninitiated may look like the result of intelligent purposeful design. 
Finding the shortest path to a food source, building complicated anthills, 
and defending it. No intelligent designer is needed, self-organisation 
based upon a few simple rules can apparently bring about an order 
incomprehensible to the individual actors.  
 What Hayek, and others, are saying is in fact, that something similar 
is happening in human societies. This is how we may understand the 
cryptical quote in the beginning of this section. Markets, democracies, 
scientific and technological developments as well as la Ola waves, are 
brought about not through a kind of intelligent designer with control over 
our future, but through the more or less spontaneous actions of 
individuals. Acting of course within the constraints and possibilities 
brought about by the actions of previous generations of human beings, 
like existing markets, democracy, values, and the present scale of 
scientific and technological development. The existing structure results in 
a kind of downward determination
84, in the sense that it determines the 
avenues open for further spontaneous development.  
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Instead of the previous quest for control theories and ideas we thus get 
something more akin to the emergence of order in complex systems.  
“Emergent change consists of ongoing accommodations, adaptations, 
and alterations that produce fundamental change without a priori inten-
tion to do so. Emergent change occurs when people reaccomplish rou-
tines and when they deal with contingencies, breakdowns, and opportuni-
ties in everyday work.”
85  
 Modern attempts to understand and explain how this may come 
about, have often been inspired by relatively recent developments of 
theories of complexity and self-organisation in the natural sciences. There 
is no unitary complexity theory, but many different and overlapping theo-
ries
86. In order to understand what a complex systems is, one often refers 
to examples of such systems, talking about anthills, markets, or physical 
systems. In general though complex systems are described by the fol-
lowing characteristics: They are dynamic, meaning that they change over 
time with previous states influencing present states. They are nonlinear, 
meaning that small disturbances may produce unforeseeable effects, 
large, small or none at all, popularly referred to as the butterfly principle. 
They may show emergence, meaning that through a process of self-
organisation they may give rise to new and complex structures that can-
not directly be derived from the simpler structures. An example here 
would be the anthill that is a result of the simple actions of countless ants. 
This fits the variant of complexity theories known under the label Com-
plex Adaptive Systems or CAS.   
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“CASs are self-organizing in that there is no overall blueprint or 
external determinant of how the system develops; instead, the pattern of 
behaviour of the system evolves or emerges from the local interaction of 
the agents within it. It is this self-organizing ability which allows such 
systems to adapt to their environment in order to survive.”
87  
It is evident that these aspects of complex systems mean that they will 
be impossible to control and foresee, although it may appear so in inter-
vals of relative stability.  
 In this paper we are especially interested in the properties relating to 
self-organisation. Properties that include: Absence of external control for 
instance in the shape of an intelligent omnipotent designer or a plan; 
Instability and criticality, referring back to nonlinearity and to more or 
less sudden phase changes; Redundancy and robustness; Self-mainte-
nance; Adaptability; Emergence; Local interaction. An illustration may 
make it clear what this means in practical organisational terms.  
Imagine, that a group of young boys, who are the sole survivors of an 
airplane crash, land on an isolated and uninhabited island
88. This example 
is of course inspired by Golding's book “Lord of the Flies”. But here we 
give it a twist such that the story unfolds in a way totally different from 
Golding’s.  
Some of the tasks most of the boys agree upon after the first meeting, 
are tasks essential for survival. Building a kind of shelter, finding or 
hunting for food, preparing food, and collecting water: Nothing too com-
plicated on an island, where there is enough resources for this. There is 
no omnipotent leader here, no designer making a plan for everybody else. 
Now we place a kind of magnifying glass over one of these tasks, for 
instance the building of a shelter. Would the boys know what is meant by 
a shelter? We may suppose that they have a vague notion, a primitive 
notion of how houses are constructed, with some kind of roof, supports 
and with walls for protection. They may have some idea of collecting 
materials that could be used for a roof, thinking of course of something 
that would be impermeable, something that water would run off, some-
thing having a certain extension, and solidity, while not being too heavy. 
Likewise they would need something that could support and maybe 
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anchor the roof. Something that would hold up the roof material, and per-
haps constitute walls. All this might go on without discussion.  
Each of the boys may act with only a vague idea of the whole thing. 
They may look to palm leaves as roofing material, testing them for the 
purpose with their fingers, measuring them with their eyes, still with no 
clear idea of how they could be fitted together as a roof, whether they 
would need many layers to make water run off or what. Many minds 
would be active, see, probe, and discard possibilities, carry material to the 
spot chosen, perhaps experimenting with ability of the branches to 
support weight, or testing their flexibility, or their brittleness etc.  
Their attempts may reach critical points or result in unforeseen set-
backs, for example in relation to construction of the support structure for 
the shelter and the attempts to secure palm leaves for protection against 
the elements. Suddenly, the construction may collapse under the weight 
of the last element added, and a new solution must be tried.  
Redundancy and robustness may show up in the multitude of ideas 
emerging in the heads of individual boys and in their ability to act as sub-
stitutes for each other in their efforts. Self-maintenance and adaptability 
may also be observed.  
The result of the whole unplanned and un-managed activity of the 
boys might be that in the end a shelter emerges that fulfils the need for 
protection against rain and perhaps wind.  
Of course the boys are not ants, they have a conscious idea of the pur-
pose and perhaps even vague conceptions of a shelter. It is just that in 
some instances it may actually look as if the solution they “discover” is a 
result of the qualities of the materials and the environment.  
 What one might find in this instance are not the typical elements of 
management: “Prevoyance, Organisation, Commandment, Controle.”
89 
There is no clear prevoyance, no conception, no plan, there is only a 
vague idea of what a shelter is and of the purpose it has to fulfil. Formal 
organisational structures may be almost nonexistent in as much as every-
one just goes off in search of what he believes might be relevant for the 
shelter. Tasks are not consciously divided up by any one. No single boy is 
in command. 
 The construction emerges so to speak from the mutual activities of 
several boys having in the beginning only vague ideas of what they are 
constructing and for what purpose, but slowly, through mutual interac-
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tion, and interaction with their environment, a shelter emerges, and an 
idea becomes more focused and concrete.  
This example may show how different the ideas of complexity, self-
organisation and downward determination are compared to the theories 
found in the quest for control, with their emphasis on the ability to make 
precise predictions, create clear goals and design detailed plans, proce-
dures and tools that will allow us to reach the goals and thus realise the 
predicted future. 
Now, one may perhaps agree that in a small scale example like the 
boy’s attempt to build a shelter some kind of self-organisation may work, 
but in the real world we would of course like to have plans for construc-
tion, not only of buildings, but for almost every human effort we can 
think of. We would want to have some measure of predictability and 
intelligent control over the future.  
 What we forget is that some kind of self-organisation is at work in 
large scale human endeavours too, like the market system, democracies, 
emergence of large scale peoples movements, revolutions, and other large 
upheavals. It may be more difficult to see that self-organisation is also at 
work in scientific and technological developments, although many of us 
are participating in this every day, just think of the World Wide Web. 
In short some of these examples may indicate that important institu-
tions and social progress are in fact dependent on some kind of large 
scale self-organisation. Attempts to create societies based on a kind of 
intelligent design in the shape of a planned economy with strong internal 
controls lost out in the competition with more open societies with less 
centralised control and more scope for self-organisation.  
In the light of what we have just been discussing the attempts to make 
complete descriptions like those belonging to ISO-standards and the so-
called clear goals are futile. At most they might act like an attempt to 
build an iron cage in which it would be difficult to envisage creativity, 
change, and development. It would be difficult to imagine that such 
descriptions and prescriptions could cover every eventuality. It would not 
contain prescriptions for handling unforeseen exceptions to the 
descriptions found in the plan.  
Thus we can conclude that it will neither be possible nor cost effective 
to specify all elements of even simple work processes in a kind of master 
mind scheme. Although it may look as if this is being done in compli-
cated technical procedures, for instance when constructing and flying off 39 
space shuttles. Here it might be relevant to think back to the O-ring dis-
aster, which may show that even attempting to plan technical aspects to 
the last detail, we cannot leave out human discretion. There would still be 
scope for self-organisation, self-reference and self-control, albeit on 
another level than in the case with the boys constructing a shelter. 
 Members of CREDO have studied attempts to create pockets of self-
organisation in practice. Most recently in Bombardier Transportation, a 
Danish subsidiary of the Canadian Bombardier Company
90, and in TDC, 
a large Danish provider of communications solutions.  
Bombardier Transportation is involved in renovating train sets for 
European customers. Having a local management believing in some of 
the ideas presented here, they tried to establish what they called co-man-
aging groups of blue-collar workers. Apparently with some success, if 
one is to believe results of the two studies made by CREDO members. A 
small excerpt from one of the interviews with a mechanic may illustrate 
how self-organisation might work in detail: 
“If there is something that has to be solved right now, and one has an 
idea how, then it is important to solve it immediately self … For example, 
here in the late morning I had some defective components from the sub-
supplier. They have to be sent back to the sub-supplier and remade, but 
then it takes a long time before we get them back. So I take some paint 
and repair the components. I have taken the decision on my own in the 
situation, and it took 10 minutes to solve it. Because if they have first to 
go through our quality department to be sent back, remade and painted 
again it is not worth the effort if the problem can be solved in 10 min-
utes.”
91  
Something like that happened in several instances, often involving a 
group of people working together and bringing their different abilities 
into play, in order to solve unforeseen problems here and now. This small 
example may show how different the basic approach advocated here is 
from the attempt to bring activities under detailed control for instance 
through an ISO-9000 approach.  
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 The self-organising efforts in the TDC were more limited in scope, 
but also demonstrated some of the possibilities of self-organisation. 
Some of the ideas that we get from the discussion of theoretical alter-
natives to the “Quest for control” approaches, and our examples can be 
summarised like this: 
  
-  The impossibility of complete control and foresight. 
-  The impossibility of complete specification. 
-  The possibilities of self-organisation and self-regulation. 
-  The “intelligence” and creative potential of groups of individuals. 
-  The robustness and self-repairing properties of self-organising 
groups. 
 
The differences between the more traditional view discussed in the 
previous section and the view presented here may perhaps be summarised 








General orientation  Linear prediction and 
control 
Non linear complexity 
and emergence 




Sense of purpose  
Achievements  Planned  Emergent 
Use of general know-
ledge, abilities 
Limited  Expansive 
General problem-solving 
capability 
Not necessary  Necessary and possible 
Redundance and 
Robustness 
Low, vulnerable  High, flexible and 
adaptable 
Control  External control  Internal self-regulation 
Responsibility  Limited  High 





This table of course has some of the characteristics of a traditional 
management view, i.e. simple boxes and dichotomous categories, but it 
would be foolish to think that our choices are binary, that we have to 
choose between either control based approaches or self-organisation. That 
is not the case, but it may be necessary to overemphasise the possibilities 
that self-organisation presents us with, in order to counteract the 
distortions brought about by quest for control reflections, and thus 
perhaps enable a better balance of quest for control positions and self-
organisations. 
The need for self-organisation may of course be especially important 
in societies and organisations characterised by a high degree of 
complexity in the internal structure or of their environment, by dynamic 
change, rapid evolution, and dependence on knowledge and innovation. 
In these circumstances the traditional “quest for control” ideas and tools 
may be especially stupid and harmful.  
8. Competent judgment instead of “half-measures”  
In an earlier section we criticised the many attempts to measure every 
thing that counts, to get a measure of all things, by counting only what 
can be measured – preferably along a cardinal, ratio or ordinal scale.  
The attempts to measure performance, to give quantifiable accounts, 
to audit, are “half-measures” in the sense, that they only take account of 
the aspects that can somehow be identified and measured explicitly. More 
or less in accordance with the demands of measurement theory. They 
ignore the half that is difficult or impossible to discern directly and thus 
impossible to quantify. 
What is the alternative? If we want to avoid the problems with these 
half-measures that lead to all sorts of distortions we need something else. 
This has proved to be difficult, perhaps because we are brought up in the 
belief that numbers are somehow more reliable than mere judgments. 
Numbers have an air of scientific objectivity, and immediate and une-
quivocal commensurability.  
In the first feeble attempt to criticise the half-measures, I have tried to 
use the example of a chair to discuss how one might understand and 42 
measure chairishness of chair
92 in order to get a measure of its quality. 
The following ideas represent a further attempt to counter the distortions 
brought about by the maniacal rush to quantify more and more aspects of 
our lives. 
 In order to make the problem as it were manageable, I shall limit this 
part of the discussion to some of the issues involved in attempts to meas-
ure quality.  
If a product is made by an ISO certified company, I suppose that many 
might think that this means that its product must be of good quality. In 
fact the ISO certification only means that the company in question lives 
up to its own defined standards, whatever they may be. Davis mentions 
that a company “can be certified to produce tables with seventeen legs or 
light bulbs that “pop” after three uses”
93. An ISO certification only means 
that a company has stated in writing that it will play according to certain 
rules, and also in writing, that it will live up to these rules of the game in 
its transactions with its customers. In other words, standards may be low, 
but they have to be documented and met consistently. 
Then there are the different definitions of quality to be found in busi-
ness school curricula. Stating for instance that quality means that the 
product or service conforms to certain requirements. Or referring to 
Juran’s definition: "Quality is fitness for use”.
94 It has also been popular 
to see quality as “meeting customer expectations,” or more subtle “giving 
the customers a little more than they expected”.
95 
Using one of these definitions to box in quality, it may look as if it is 
possible to get a measure of quality. A measure of how well one is meet-
ing expectations may be had by asking the customers to rate one’s prod-
ucts or services. But this does not get us very far. Expectations are neither 
fixed, nor do they float freely in the air. They may in fact stem from 
commercials created by the company, whose products are being rated. In 
this case we may logically conclude, that a higher measure of quality 
could be achieved, if one could somehow lower the expectations of cus-
tomers. I wonder though, if that would be such a smart idea. 
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 How then might we establish what quality is, and how do we get a 
“full measure of quality”?  
Perhaps Mill’s ideas on higher and lower pleasures might help us.  
“It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are 
low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly 
endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, 
as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its 
imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy 
the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only 
because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It 
is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be 
Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are 
of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the 
question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.”
96  
 There we have it! Those who have more experience, who are recog-
nised as having more knowledge about a certain subject, and who possess 
the ability to use this to make subtle distinctions, are those who define 
what good quality is. Quality can never be defined by those who don’t 
have experience of “higher pleasures”. Discerning judges define what is 
meant by quality, whatever product or service we are looking at. Even the 
competent judges will of course be influenced by the products and serv-
ices offered, but they will at least know how to make sophisticated com-
parisons. 
This at least brings us past the simple “satisfaction of expectations” 
version. Most of us may in fact quietly or unknowingly adhere to the 
view presented here, when we make decisions about what product or 
service to buy.  
If this more or less takes care of the question what quality is, there 
remains the vexing problem of how quality is measured. Continuing the 
argument from above the answer might be that overall verbal judgments 
and simple comparisons are often as far as we ought to go. The problem 
is, that competent judges in their judgments rely on both explicit and for-
mal knowledge, and implicit and tacit knowledge, and combine this in 
what may commonly be called wisdom. 
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If important parts of a judgment rely on tacit knowledge, it would be 
difficult to find a directly observable quality to relate any explicit meas-
ure to. Tacit knowledge in a sense means, that we cannot state explicitly 
what we base our judgment upon. We can only indicate the result of our 
deliberations in a judgment. Thus making it impossible to state explicitly 
all the salient factors that entered into that judgment.  
 Think, if you will, of how we recognise a face. We move from the 
silent recognition of particular features of the face to the face. We some-
how use the elementary features of faces to get at their joint meaning 
without actually being aware of neither the particulars nor the tacit proc-
ess of integrating these features into the explicit recognition.  
How do we then become competent judges. Is it something that we 
can learn? Wittgenstein’s answer is: “Yes; some can. Not, however, by 
taking a course in it, but through ‘experience’. – Can someone else be a 
man’s teacher in this? Certainly. From time to time he gives him the right 
tip – This is what ‘learning’ and ‘ teaching’ are like here. – What one 
acquires here is not a technique; one learns correct judgement. There are 
also rules, but they do not form a system, and only experienced people 
can apply them right. Unlike calculating rules.”
97  
This means that explicit measurements of aspects that are evident 
would not be enough. They would only give us those half-measures that 
ignore the tacit and implicit aspects.  
Instead of taking a multitude of measurements of explicit features like 
the ones referred to in the star-rating of hospitals, it might be a better idea 
to rely on competent judges. Or rather the competition between compe-
tent judges making verbal judgments, or devising simple rankings of the 
products or services being judged. Doing what is being done in the star 
rating scheme would result in what we have called half-measures, and the 
striving to achieve good half-measures may actually undermine, what we 
wanted to achieve in the first place. 
 When attempting to quantify how well an institution or organisation 
is performing we have to ask: In relation to what? The answer to that 
question today is often some clear, quantifiable goal set in advance. 
Number of cases treated, or number of publications for instance.  
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In recent evaluation of a report made by The National Audit Office of 
Denmark
98 this problem became evident. The report represented an audit 
of the efforts made by the Ministry of Science, Technology and Innova-
tion to further cooperation of knowledge institutions and business, with 
the aim of increasing and realising the innovative potential of business. 
In an exemplary case, institutions carried out performance accounting 
on a yearly base. The performance measure used, was the amount of 
technological advice and service given by these institutions to private 
companies. This of course tells us something about the amount of activity 
in institutions, but it does not tell us what effect it had on the innovative 
potential and its realisation. One can only hope that the measure had 
some relation to the overall purpose of the initiative. 
It would seem, that similar problems are a characteristic feature in 
many of today’s audit attempts, concentrating on (ac)counting for the 
amount of activity. What seems to disappear from such attempts, is the 
overall purpose. Instead of trying to evaluate the effect on the innovation 
potential, which was the purpose of the initiatives, the focus is on 
counting activities. The explanation for this bias is probably, that this 
represents the only way one is able to give an account in precise 
quantitative terms.  
Such an account may not be relevant for judging whether an institu-
tion fulfils its purpose, but it demands for objectivity as demonstrated by 
explicitness and quantification, overrides any interest in judging, whether 
an institution is fulfilling its purpose. 
 The pervasiveness of “objectification” and “quantification” attempts 
may have serious consequences, in as much as it may pervert the efforts 
of all those who are subject to it. It perverts their efforts in the sense, that 
they will discover that their own success and that of their institutions will 
depend on their ability to deliver results that suit this demand for “objec-
tification” and “quantification”. Biasing their efforts in a way that in itself 
undermines the whole attempt to achieve objectivity.  
The multitude of attempts to create objective and quantifiable meas-
ures, the trust in numbers, may destroy the trust in people and especially 
of course the trust in professionals and their ability to act as competent 
judges. The pseudo-objective systems of tools and measures substitute 
trust in people for trust in systems and instruments, thus reducing the 
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need for trust in competent judges. Even worse, it may induce the self-
same judges to disregard their own competencies, instead forcing them to 
act in an opportunistic way to fulfil the demands of the measurement and 
audit systems. A little flippantly: It may become more important to 
document one’s waste of time than doing something worthwhile that does 
not fit into the measurement system. 
Here I shall advocate almost the opposite approach, that we create 
opportunities to use one’s insight and sense of responsibility to support 
the creation of more and more competent judges. This would mean that 
we reduce the need for detailed measurement and audit schemes, and 
leave more to self-organising groups, and the insight and responsibility of 
members of such groups. Trusting them to use these abilities in their 
efforts to work for a given purpose, and trusting them to be able to correct 
their own efforts if necessary. The emphasis here is on trust. Trust in pro-
fessionals as competent judges reduces the need for trust in systems, and 
in relation to the topic discussed here, it reduces the need for detailed 
measurement and audits.  
9. The will to lead 
In Drucker’s view “Good spirit in a management organisation means that 
the energy turned out is larger than the sum of the efforts put in. It means 
the creation of energy. This, clearly, cannot be accomplished by mecha-
nical means. A mechanical contrivance can at its theoretical best conserve 
energy intact; it cannot create it. To get out more than is being put in is 
possible only in the moral sphere.”
99 As I see it, mindless management 
does not contribute to the good spirit. What we are looking for is leader-
ship.  
To find that, we return to the boys’ game and look for the emergence 
of leadership.  
During the shelter building activities it may become evident, that one 
of the boys has a clearer idea of the overall construction and the efforts 
needed to achieve it, than the rest. This might be recognised tacitly by the 
rest with the result that a leader emerges, at first slowly and impercepti-
bly, later perhaps a little more convincingly. One that seems to focus and 
catalyse their joint efforts. He might be the one to focus their energies by 
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being more eager, by urging, by prodding, by insisting. The one to have 
an answer, when a boy asks, “where am I going to put these leaves?” The 
one to jump for a solution to a construction question, seeing the need to 
weigh carefulness against urgency. The one to coordinate the simultane-
ous effort of several individuals, for instance when having to lift or move 
a heavy object. “[T]he various members of the group may merely accept 
one member as the ‘leader’ and adjust their movements to his—a group 
of men heaving a heavy load, for example.”
100 
Thus spontaneous self-organisation might also create its own kind of 
leadership. To the mutual directedness of the boys may thus be added the 
other directedness of a leader focusing and unifying their efforts. In the 
boy’s game the boys coalesced around one person and his actions, almost 
as if he was a condensation point for particles. This coalescence depended 
on two things, the latent urge felt by the boys joining, almost as if they 
were super cooled water droplets in a cloud, and the early realisation of 
this latent urge in the emerging leader.  
The boys may feel the urge to do something, but nothing happens un-
less they can coalesce around some condensation point. Someone must 
show a possible way, a vision to believe in, an action to imitate and fol-
low. 
The leader emerging in the fictional example may help us to under-
stand how real leaders drive the creation of new organisations and 
changes in the existing organisations. Not on their own and not only 
because of their individual qualities, but because they are condensation 
points and energisers of the latent striving, that can be found in the people 
wanting to join the effort. 
 “Self-managing organizations redistribute power to make decisions to 
people who have the strategic know-how, or to groups who are responsi-
ble for a whole work process. Under such new arrangements, the tradi-
tional tasks of management—planning, controlling, organizing, and coor-
dinating the work of others—no longer makes sense. Rather, it is man-
agement’s responsibility to create the conditions that allow people to 
plan, control and organize, and coordinate their own work.”
101 
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Spontaneous self-organisation may only bring an organisation this far, 
a couple of rowers may adjust to each other without any direction, but a 
trireme with a large number of rowers needs direction to synchronise 
their efforts, and direction to point them to a goal.  
Even more direction and coordination of efforts is needed in a com-
plex modern organisation. The role of a leader may be to provide this 
direction. Once more it may prove more profitable to look to leaders who 
provide direction and focus without prescribing the exact route to take. 
They stand for and communicate the big idea, they do not specify what 
activities every member of the organisation has to perform in order to 
realise the idea. The leader’s direction-giving activities may be compared 
to the “I have a dream” directions. I dream of a new kind of computer, a 
new kind of windmill, a new service on the Internet, or something much 
bigger, like a new kind of society. 
In their “New Manifesto for Management” Ghoshal, Bartlett and 
Moran
102 see a new view of management taking shape: “based on a better 
understanding of individual and corporate motivation. As companies 
switch their focus from value appropriation to value creation, facilitating 
cooperation among people takes precedence over enforcing compliance, 
and initiative is valued more than obedience. The manager's primary task 
becomes embedding trust, leading change, and establishing a sense of 
purpose within the company that allows strategy to emerge from within 
the organization, from the energy and alignment created by that sense of 
purpose. The core of the managerial role gives way to the "three Ps": pur-
pose, process, and people — replacing the traditional "strategy-structure-
systems" trilogy that worked for companies in the past.”
103  
Ghoshal, Bartlett and Moran may talk of management, but their 
emphasis on trust, change, creation of purpose, has more to do with lead-
ership than with a traditional view of management. 
A spirit that calls upon man’s reserves of dedication cannot be had by 
a goal like “a 20 percent increase in sales.” It must be something more, 
something that touches the deeper values and beliefs of the members of 
the organisation, confirming them, and giving them a more concrete 
shape. The leading part of leadership must include the ability to identify, 
amplify, and make concrete some of the important values and beliefs of 
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the members of the organisation. We postulate a complementary relation-
ship. If this complementarity is lacking it is doubtful whether one can talk 
of self-organising groups. Groups manipulated through framing or rhe-
torical tricks would certainly in a very basic sense be organised and 
steered from the outside. 
This is where values and beliefs enter the picture, and no stronger 
drivers may be found. These drivers may be latent or expressive. They 
may consist of shared social drivers found in environmental movements, 
human rights movements, and it is likely that they also represent some of 
the strongest drivers of organisations, especially those belonging to the 
new economy. They may be the drivers of people who want to work for 
organisations, whose goals and activities fit their own values, whether 
they realise it or not.  
Even in traditionally strongly hierarchical and regulated organisations 
like banks such principles may work, as shown by CREDO’s research
104 
into Jyske Bank’s attempt to introduce elements of value-based leader-
ship in the whole organisation. According to Jensen
105 the basic idea in 
this reorientation is that detailed regulation, control, and sanctioning are 
reduced and substituted by a strong reliance on the integrity and ability of 
local units and individual decision-makers to act rationally in relation to 
the stated goals, policies, and values of the organisation.  
In practice this has meant that all decisions are made according to a 
two tier system, called by the German term “Vier Augen” principle. 
Credit approval decisions made according to this principle demand, that 
one person makes the recommendation and another approves, or disap-
proves as the case may be. No more than two persons are involved, and 
the approver may be another employee, not necessarily a manager. In this 
way a certain kind of reciprocity is possible. “Designed to cut red tape, 
speed up customer-related decisions, and unambiguously place responsi-
bility, this system has made it nearly inescapable for individual managers 
to delegate real authority to their staff. Authority, e.g. for credit granting, 
is assigned on the basis of an evaluation of the professional competence 
of the individual staff member combined with an assessment of the needs, 
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e.g. typical size of credit lines, of his or her customer portfolio. Compared 
with earlier, and with the distribution of authority of most competitors, 
this has considerably enhanced the local decision-making capabilities of 
the bank.”
106 
The characteristic of the view of leadership presented here may be 
summarised as follows, again using a form usually connected with tradi-
tional management tools, the list, creating an impression of simple, dis-
connected categories, which is certainly not the case. 
 
Purpose, idea, meaning, direction 
Ambiguousness and open-endedness 
Longer term obligation and mutual trust 
Tenacity and consistency 
Example setting  
The will to will, the power to will 
 
Purpose, idea, meaning, direction. Leadership must be able to focus 
the organisation on the overall purpose of the organisation, in contrast to 
the previous criticised focus on clear goals and performance measures. 
Leaders must be able in practice to show and stand for an idea that 
answers the question: What are we doing? They must be able to answer 
the question: why are we doing this? By contributing to the creation of 
meaning. And they must be able to indicate the answer to the question: 
Where are we going? By contributing to a sense of direction, not by set-
ting concrete goals and a set of numbers, but through focusing on a pur-
pose that will unite the efforts of the members of the organisation. 
Ambiguousness and open-endedness. Instead of establishing clear and 
quantifiable goals and detailed plans and descriptions for how to achieve 
them, a demand often seen in modern management recommendations, it 
may be more important to do the opposite, letting the purpose of the 
organisation guide the efforts of organisation, leaving open the exact way 
this purpose might be fulfilled, in order to involve the whole organisation 
in the generation of ideas, and solutions for problems encountered. If 
members of an organisation have a fairly clear idea of the purpose, it may 
unite the efforts in a far more meaningful way than a detailed plan does, 
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and it might involve the individual members in thinking and experiment-
ing with new approaches. 
 Open-endedness is quickly becoming a necessity: “'Globalization', it 
is argued, creates an environment characterized by massive uncertainty. 
In such an environment only those organizations that can rapidly change 
their conduct and learn to become ever-more enterprising will survive. In 
other words, the dislocatory effects generated by an intensification in 
patterns of global interconnectedness require 'constant creativity' and the 
continuous construction of collective operational spaces that rest less and 
less upon 'mechanistic' forms and practices - 'bureaucracy' - and increas-
ingly upon the development of more entrepreneurial forms and modes of 
conduct.”
107 
That ambiguousness and open-endedness may only work under con-
ditions of longer term obligations and mutual trust seems evident. This 
does not fit the short term demands upon managers brought about for 
instance by a shareholder focus and quarterly statements. It demands 
instead a longer term commitment. There may be an emerging realisation 
that something like this is necessary, even in the US, where the CFA, 
Centre and Business Roundtable Institute for Corporate Ethics Report, in 
2006 amongst others recommended: “Endorse corporate leadership in 
communicating long-term strategic objectives and related performance 
benchmarks rather than in providing quarterly earnings guidance. … 
Align corporate executive compensation with long-term goals and strate-
gies and with long-term shareowner interests. Compensation should be 
structured to achieve long-term strategic and value-creation goals.”
108  
There may also be a problem in relation to the education and the 
career plans of modern business school educated managers, with their 
focus upon management methods and more interested perhaps in their 
own career, and less in the organisation. Leadership in our view would 
demand a longer term relationship with those who are to be led, in order 
for obligation and trust to work. 
A similar argument can be made for tenacity and consistency. The 
ideas presented in this paper may be difficult to realise in practise. They 
certainly do not represent a new tool that can just be implemented from 
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above. They represent a change in attitude and ideology, and it requires 
tenacity and consistency over time to realise some of the ideas presented. 
 In today’s organisation there is no end to the stream of non-committal 
visions, missions and value statements that are supposed to unite the 
efforts and provide a sense of shared values and culture in the organisa-
tion. Most of these function more or less like peacock feathers. They may 
be eye-catching, but have no other purpose. They represent a continuation 
of the tool wielding management approach.  
The way that one demonstrates the real values of an organisation is of 
course through the examples that one’s decisions and actions set. So 
action is demanded, not more paperwork. 
 Without the will to will and the power to will all this will come to 
nothing. Leaders must possess a will to will and must be able to engage 
the will power of others. 
“To engage willpower behind particular projects or goals, leaders need 
to do precisely the opposite of what they typically do. They need to create 
a desire for action without encouraging superficial acquiescence. They 
need to make commitment more difficult and build in barriers rather than 
trying to get quick buy-ins. They need to make their people consider con-
flicts, doubts, anxieties and emotional ambivalence. They need to tell 
them about difficulties, costs and privations rather then painting rosy 
pictures of the tasks. Overall, leadership that counts on unleashing will-
power is a much more difficult way of winning people over. But, it is 
much more effective and, in the end, less risky than motivating managers 
and counting on their half-hearted acceptance.”
109 
10. Counterdistortions? 
Mainstream ideas of organisation and management all emphasise the 
importance of formal and explicit knowledge, and explicit rules. Know-
ledge in the shape of algorithms for how to solve certain tasks, according 
to the scheme “if a then b or else,” and very explicit written rules for how 
to act in specified situations.  
The foundations for an alternative to the mainstream views of organi-
sation and management are found in the idea that complex activities are 
characterised by a high degree of self-organisation. This view may be 
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characterised as the ant-hill view. It is not about the complicated structure 
of a complicated machine, like a fine watch. Instead it is about the com-
plexity of an interacting system of elements each of which may be sim-
ple, but whose interaction produces complexity through complicated 
positive and negative feed back loops. It is about self-referential, self-
replicating and recombinant systems. Such systems are non-deterministic 
in the sense that their future states cannot accurately be predicted, and 
they may show emergent properties. Complexity and emergence are also 
characteristics that one would expect to find in modern innovative 
organisations.  
It is asserted that the viability and efficiency of the modern organi-
sation or company are dependent on knowledge being distributed in the 
heads and minds of the individual members of the organisation, and nei-
ther concentrated in a single manager nor in a collection of algorithms.  
This view of organisation would preclude the use of the all pervasive 
tool-wielding view of modern management theory. What is needed 
instead is a new view of leadership. A view compatible with a large 
degree of self-organisation. An analogy with a human mind might be 
relevant. Somehow the “I” resides in the neural network of our brain, and 
the “I” can think consciously. This “I” in itself emerges from the actions 
of the parallel activities of the neurons of the brain. How this works we 
may not know, but the results are obvious.  
When the conscious “I” wants to do something intentional, like writ-
ing these sentences, the “I” does not have to do a lot, most of the task 
seems to be taken care of automatically. Somehow the parallelism of the 
brain self-organises the task, sending messages to arms and fingers etc. 
The “I” does not have to do all the detailed work. In a sense, one might 
say that the “I” directs the activities of self-organising networks of 
neurons, without really knowing how they perform their act.  
In a similar way leadership would convey and represent the idea, the 
meaning, and the direction of the organisation, without planning, super-
vising and controlling in detail the activities of the members of the 
organisation.  
The arguments presented in the second part of the paper may perhaps 
seem to go too far and lack a foundation in really convincing research of 
the kind we have criticised. This may be right, but in order to counteract 
the distortions brought about by modern management theory it would 
seem quite appropriate. It would then represent a counter distortion that 54 
would counteract the distortions of the looking glass of modern manage-
ment theory. The combined effect would enable us to construct non-dis-
torting reflection of theories and understandings that could point the way 
to a new practice. 
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